Publications: Communication and Behavior in Organizations: An Experiment (with Umberto Garfagnini). Forthcoming, Quantitative Economics. Third-party Manipulation of Conflict: An Experiment (with Umberto Garfagnini) Experimental Economics, Volume 21, Issue 1, March 2018, 27-49 Forward Induction: Thinking and Behavior (with Aldo Rustichini) Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 128, August 2016, 195-208. Working Papers: Higher-order Learning (with Umberto Garfagnini) Update: 3/12/2019 Abstract: We use a novel experimental design to study how players update their beliefs about the beliefs of others. We find that higher-order beliefs respond to information about how lower-order beliefs are formed and are updated more slowly when a player faces uncertainty about others' information. We also identify a novel behavioral bias: Higher-order beliefs become less accurate over time, even as more information becomes available. We argue that this is driven by a failure of theory of mind, i.e., a failure of players to correctly predict the way in which others form beliefs. On Myopic Loss Aversion Update: 3/20/2019 Abstract: It has been widely documented in laboratory experiments that subjects act more risk-averse when they make their decisions frequently (e.g., one as opposed to several decisions at a time), a phenomenon dubbed ``myopic loss aversion'' by Benartzi and Thaler (1995). The present paper shows that this standard pattern of behavior can be reversed with a simple change in the experimental design. The results cannot be explained by mental accounting or loss aversion but are consistent with the simple hypothesis that behavior is less random when the stakes are higher. Delayed Review in Repeated Relationships Reject and Resubmit, Games and Economic Behavior Abstract:Many theoretical results rely on delayed review of imperfect information for sustaining cooperative outcomes. This paper uses a laboratory experiment designed around a repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect monitoring to study what effect delay has on cooperation in practice. Information was received in every period of the game in one treatment and every other period of the game in another. While the parameters were chosen so that equilibrium welfare is higher with delay, the welfare levels in the two treatments were similar. Moreover, subjects were less likely to cooperate with than without delay in additional treatments where the game was played against a computer with an equilibrium trigger strategy. The results suggest that the cooperating-enhancing effect of exogenous delay of information may be smaller than predicted for two reasons: endogenous leniency in subjects' punishment strategies and an element of randomness in behavior. Work in progress: Parallel Markets in School Choice: An Experiment (with Rustam Hakimov and Bertan Turhan) Coming soon!